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Note
Washington v. Harper: The Supreme Court
Defines Procedural Due Process
in the Prison
I. INTRODUCTION
The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a heaven of Hell, a hell of Heaven'
The American constitutional system places great priority on the
right to be left alone. That right, however, may succumb to over-
riding and compelling state interests. This long established princi-
ple of American governance poses a unique question in the context
of the lawful imprisonment of an individual: whether an inmate's
protectable due process liberty interest overrides the state's interest
in the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. More specifi-
cally, the question posits what procedural safeguards are due
before the state may deprive an inmate of the right to be left alone.
In Washington v. Harper,2 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed these issues. First, the Court held that an inmate has a
substantive due process right in avoiding forced medication. The
Court then applied the rational relationship test, and found that
the prison regulation that allowed forced medication was constitu-
tional. Addressing the procedural due process issue, the Court
found that an administrative hearing before psychiatrists provided
adequate procedural protections of the inmate's liberty interest.
This Note analyzes Washington v. Harper and its impact on the
constitutional rights of prison inmates. The Note begins with a
discussion of the substantive and procedural due process guaran-
tees of the fourteenth amendment as they relate to prison inmates.
Next, it presents in detail the lower court and the Supreme Court
decisions. Finally, the Note criticizes the majority opinion's failure
to provide adequate due process protections to prison inmates who
still possess fundamental substantive and procedural due process
rights that guarantee them the right to remain free from bodily
intrusions.
1. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST 17 (R. Hughes ed. 1935) (bk.I, 11. 254-55).
2. 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Due Process in the Prison Setting
1. Substantive Due Process
The twentieth century saw the notion of substantive due process
develop into a divergent source for the protection of individual lib-
erty interests. The Constitution's due process clauses and various
state laws define the individual liberty interests that guide the
American constitutional system.
Historically, the Court has treated imprisoned individuals differ-
ently. 5 Initially, convicted criminals forfeited all of their liberty
and personal rights by virtue of their incarceration.6 The United
States Supreme Court, however, eventually recognized that an in-
mate retains certain substantive rights and privileges during im-
prisonment,7 although these rights may be lessened or restricted
during the individual's prison term.8
3. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part
that a State cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,
223-27 (1976)). Hewitt is an example of a state law providing the source of a liberty
interest. In Hewitt, the United States Supreme Court held that a regulation that em-
ployed unmistakably mandatory language created a protected liberty interest. Id at 470-
72. The Court held that a prison inmate had a liberty interest in remaining in the general
prison population. Id at 472. The Court stated that the Pennsylvania regulations cre-
ated this interest by using the unmistakably mandatory language that certain procedures
"shall," "will," or "must" be provided. Id at 471. The regulation also provided that
administrative segregation would not occur without certain substantive predicates. Id at
472. Although the inmate had such a liberty interest, the Court decided this case on
procedural due process grounds, holding that the procedures that Helms received pro-
vided him with adequate protection. Id. For a discussion of procedural due process, see
infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
5. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. "[The inmate] is for the time being a slave of the state." Ruffin v. Commonwealth,
62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
7. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). For example, in Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court stated that the right to personal security is an
historically protected liberty interest. Id. at 673. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982), the Court explained the right to personal security is not extinguished even if law-
ful confinement is for penal purposes. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315 (citing Hutto v. Fin-
ney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)).
8. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). In Greenholtz, in-
mates claimed they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole determina-
tion. Id. at 11. The Supreme Court rejected their claim that a convict possessed a
constitutional or inherent right to parole that is protected by the due process clause. Id
at 9. The Court found that the process provided by the state statute adequately satisfied
the fourteenth amendment because it provided an opportunity to be heard and an expla-
nation of the reasons for which the parole was denied. Id at 16.
Supreme Court Defines Due Process
The Court's decision in Turner v. Safley9 demonstrated how
some prison regulations may impinge on substantive due process
rights, while others may satisfy legitimate state interests. In Tur-
ner, the Court considered the validity of two Missouri prison regu-
lations. One regulation prohibited inmates from marrying unless a
compelling reason' ° existed and the inmate obtained approval from
the prison superintendent."1 The other regulation effectively pre-
vented inmates from writing to nonfamily inmates. 2
The Court determined that a prison regulation that impinges on
a constitutional right remains valid only if it is "reasonably re-
lated" 3 to a legitimate penological interest. 4 According to the
Court, this standard of review adequately protects the inmate's
constitutional rights and the "policy of judicial restraint regarding
prisoner complaints."' 5 Applying this reasonableness standard to
the regulations in Turner, the Court found that the state's prohibi-
tion against unrelated-inmate correspondence qualified as a reason-
able means to a legitimate penological end.' 6 Furthermore, the
Court found that the prohibition did not result in a total depriva-
tion of all means of expression.' 7 The Court reached a contrary
result when it applied the same reasonableness standard to the
marriage regulation.' 8 The Court found that the regulation
prohibiting marriage between inmates, absent compelling reasons,
was an exaggerated response to the articulated end of prison
security. 19
9. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
10. Pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child constitute compelling reasons. Id.
at 96-97.
11. Id. at 82.
12. Id at 81-82.
13. Id at 89-91. The Court considered four factors in assessing the reasonableness of
the regulation: first, the regulation was not so remote to the security interest to render it
arbitrary; second, no easy alternatives existed; third, accommodation of the constitutional
right would adversely affect the prison staff, other inmates, or limited prison resources;
and finally, the regulation was not an exaggerated response to a prison concern. Id.
14. Id. at 89. Eight days after the Supreme Court handed down Turner, the Court
decided O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O'Lone, the Court applied
the Turner reasonableness standard and explained that "prison regulations alleged to in-
fringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than
that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."
Id. at 349; see also infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
15. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)).
16. Id. at 91.
17. Id. at 92. Similarly, the Supreme Court in O'Lone justified the deprivation of
fundamental rights by explaining that the inmates were not deprived of all forms of reli-
gious exercise. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352.
18. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
19. Id. at 97.
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In another decision, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,20 decided the
same day as Turner, the Supreme Court again applied the rational
relationship test to inmates' rights. In O'Lone, inmates practicing
the Islamic religion claimed that a New Jersey prison policy, which
prevented them from attending a congregational service, violated
their first amendment rights.21 The Court determined that the pol-
icy did not violate their rights under the first amendment's free
exercise clause because it was reasonably related to the legitimate
governmental interest in institutional order and security.22 Fur-
thermore, the policy was reasonable because it did not completely
ban participation in religious ceremonies. 23 Moreover, no practica-
ble alternative existed. 24
Even after determining that a substantive due process right ex-
ists and that the state's regulation is reasonably related to a legiti-
mate end, the courts must determine the amount of procedural due
process necessary to preserve that substantive due process right.25
In Vitek v. Jones,26 the United States Supreme Court found that
inmates retain the "right to be free from, and obtain judicial relief
for, unjustified intrusions on personal security. ' 27 In Vitek, prison
20. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
21. Id at 345.
22. Id. at 350-51.
23. Id at 352.
24. Id. at 352-53.
25. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983). In Hewitt, the Court used the Ma-
thews v. Eldridge balancing test and determined that the government's interest in safety
outweighed the defendant's interest in remaining in the general prison population. Id. at
473-74 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), discussed infra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text). Consequently, the procedures available to Helms, which included
some notice of the charge against him and an opportunity to present his side of the story,
satisfied the requirements of the due process clause. Id. at 476-77; see also Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court determined that a parolee had
liberty interests in activities such as gainful employment, the freedom to be with friends
and family, and the ability to form enduring attachments. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
After finding these liberty interests, the Court defined the minimum due process needed
for parole revocation: written notice of the claimed violation; disclosure of evidence
against the parolee; an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence and witnesses; the
right to cross-examine witnesses; an unbiased hearing body; and a written statement of
the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 489.
26. 445 U.S. 480 (1976).
27. Id. at 492 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). The Court
explained that the right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security is one
of the historic liberty interests protected by the due process clause. Id at 492; see also
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court recognized that
freedom from bodily restraint is a liberty interest that has always been protected by the
due process clause. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court stated that individuals have a substantial
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authorities transferred an inmate from the state prison to a mental
hospital,28 where he underwent involuntary behavior modification
treatment.29 The Court explained that this involuntary confine-
ment and treatment qualitatively differed from the terms under
which the inmate originally was convicted. a The Court held that
this transfer coupled with mandatory behavior modification consti-
tuted a deprivation of liberty that required adequate procedural
protections.3'
These recent decisions establish that lawfully incarcerated in-
mates may possess lower expectations of due process protections.
Thus, when a prison regulation infringes upon an inmate's liberty
interest, courts need only apply the reasonable relationship test to
determine whether the regulation unconstitutionally violates the
inmate's liberty interest. However, if the regulation constitutes an
exaggerated response and is not reasonably related to the penologi-
cal end, it is unconstitutional. In all cases in which a regulation
infringes on a substantive right, some amount of procedural pro-
cess is due.
2. Procedural Due Process
The Constitution also mandates that courts follow certain proce-
dures before depriving an individual of a property32 or liberty33 in-
liberty interest in remaining free from unnecessary confinement for medical treatment.
Id. at 600. Further, the Court assumed that individuals have a protectable liberty interest
in being free from unnecessary bodily restraint and stigmatization of the label of mentally
ill. Id. at 601.
28. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 484. The inmate had a liberty interest in receiving the benefits
of appropriate procedures, including a hearing, to determine whether his condition war-
ranted a transfer to a mental institution. Id. at 490.
29. Id. at 486.
30. Id. at 493. The Court also noted that adverse changes in confinement conditions
are not by themselves sufficient to trigger due process protections. No additional due
process is necessary if the "conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is
subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him." Id. (quoting Montanye v. Haynes,
427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).
31. Id. at 494. The Vitek Court decided that once a state grants a liberty interest to
inmates, due process protections are required to guarantee that the right is not arbitrarily
discontinued. Id. at 488-89.
32. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the United States Supreme
Court required a hearing similar to a judicial trial prior to discontinuance of welfare
benefits. Id. at 255. The Court, after determining that the state statute created a right to
receive welfare benefits, balanced the private interests involved and held that the individ-
ual's interest in receiving uninterrupted public assistance outweighed the state's valid in-
terest in conserving resources. Id. at 266. Thus, the Court ordered additional procedural
protections prior to termination of the benefits. Id at 266-67. These procedures in-
cluded: timely notice of the reasons for termination; and an opportunity for the individ-
ual to defend by presenting his own evidence and oral arguments and confronting adverse
1991]
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terest.34 Traditionally, due process requires some type of hearing
prior to a deprivation.35 In Mathews v. Eldridge,36 the Supreme
Court specifically set forth the factors that must be considered
when contemplating what procedures must be followed: (1) the
private interest affected by the state action; (2) the probability of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the value of additional
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including
the cost and burden necessitated by the additional procedure.37
The Court addressed the issue of procedural due process as it
applies in the prison context in Wolff v. McDonnell.38 In Wolff, the
Court questioned whether Nebraska's prison disciplinary proceed-
ings complied with the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause.39 The Nebraska prison regulations unconstitutionally de-
prived inmates of good-time credit by failing to provide adequate
procedures in disciplinary proceedings. 40 Therefore, even though
witnesses. Id. at 266-70. Also, the recipient has a right to retain counsel. Id at 268-71.
Further, the state must provide an impartial decision maker, who should disclose the
basis for the subsequent decision and the evidence that he relied on in reaching his deci-
sion. Id. at 268-71.
33. The deprivation of a liberty interest also requires adequate due process. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). "Th[e] analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted
due process analysis as to property." Id. The "right to be heard before being condemned
to suffer a grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and
hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society." Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the flexibility of constitu-
tionally required procedures should be determined after considering the "precise nature
of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected
by the governmental action." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citing Cafe-
teria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
35. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); see also supra note 32.
36. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
37. Id. at 335. In this case, the deprivation was of disability benefits under the Social
Security Act. Id. at 323. The Mathews Court distinguished Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970), discussed supra note 32, in which the welfare recipient was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits. In Mathews, however, the recipient of
Social Security disability benefits did not require an evidentiary hearing prior to termina-
tion because eligibility for disability benefits was not based on financial need as the bene-
fits in Goldberg had been and the recipient would receive full retroactive relief if
successful on appeal. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340.
38. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue again
in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980) (adequate procedure must be provided
before transfer from prison to mental hospital occurs) and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
466-72 (1983) (adequate procedural protections required prior to inmate's removal from
the general prison population into segregation).
39. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 543. Although the Constitution does not guarantee inmates
the right to good-time credit, the state statute did. Id at 557. Thus, inmates in Nebraska
were entitled to minimum procedural protections required by the due process clause to
make sure that their state-created right was not arbitrarily infringed. Id.
40. Id. at 563-73. The state failed to provide adequate procedures because it failed to
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confined in prison, these inmates retained due process rights that
guaranteed certain procedural protections of the inmate's substan-
tive due process rights.
After recognizing that inmates retain substantive due process
rights while incarcerated, and that they require procedural due
process to protect those rights, the question remains: what degree
of procedural due process is required when an inmate faces forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs? In determining whether the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs violates the inmate's
due process protections, the Court must consider the benefits and
adverse side effects of these drugs.
B. Benefits and Adverse Side Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the benefits
and dangers4" posed by antipsychotic drugs.42 The benefits include
the reduction of certain symptoms of schizophrenia43 and psycho-
sis." Patients suffering from psychiatric disorders often act in vio-
provide advance written notice of the alleged violation, a written statement reporting the
evidence relied on, and the reasons for disciplinary action taken prior to changing the
inmates terms of confinement. Id. at 563.
41. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 301-04 (1982). In Mills, the Court discussed
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981), in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Court held that a person has a protected liberty interest in "decid[ing] for him-
self whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful medical treatment that is
represented by the administration of antipsychotic drugs." Mills, 457 U.S. at 301 (quot-
ing Roe, 383 Mass. at 433 n.9, 421 N.E.2d at 51 n.9). In Mills, the Court held that this
liberty interest can be overcome only by an overwhelming state interest. Id. at 301.
Although the Court in Mills recognized the dangers of the drugs, it refused to address the
constitutional issue of whether any protectable liberty interest might be derived from the
Constitution itself. Id. at 305.
42. Antipsychotic drugs are also known as neuroleptics and major tranquilizers.
Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients' Right to Refuse
Psychotropic Drugs, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 107, 109 (1985). The most commonly used antip-
sychotic drugs are Prolixin, Stelazine, Thorazine, Hadol, Navane, and Sparine. Id. at
109.
Antipsychotic drugs work by altering the chemical balance in the brain. This type of
treatment has been equated to electroconvulsive therapy which effectively treats depres-
sion by altering the chemical balance in the brain. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 16 n.40, Washington v. Harper,
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599) (citing Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp., 196 Cal. App. 3d
1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, modified, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987);
People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967 (Colo. 1985); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730,
731-32 (Ky. 1981)).
43. Schizophrenia is defined as "any of a group of severe emotional disorders, usually
of psychotic proportions, characterized by misinterpretation and retreat from reality,
delusions, hallucinations, ambivalence, inappropriate affect, and withdrawn, bizarre, or
regressive behavior." THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTION-
ARY 628 (1987).
44. Psychosis is "[a] mental disorder causing gross distortion or disorganization of a
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lent and self-destructive ways. Initially, antipsychotic drugs sedate
the patient and then modify certain schizophrenic symptoms. 5 As
the drugs reduce and control the patient's violent tendencies," less
hospitalization47 and more humane treatment is possible.
Although antipsychotic drugs may offer effective treatment for
psychosis,49 three basic problems arise from the use of these
drugs.50 First, these drugs produce potentially permanent harmful
and disabling side effects. Second, antipsychotic drugs do not
cure mental illness, but rather treat only the symptoms of psycho-
sis. 52 Finally, these drugs ineffectively treat certain mental disor-
ders such as manic depression5 3 and are least effective when used in
long-term treatment. 54
The most serious problem posed is the possibility of permanent
and disabling side effects. 55 Frequently, these side effects emerge as
person's mental capacity, affective response, and capacity to recognize reality, communi-
cate, and relate to others to the degree of interfering with his capacity to cope with the
ordinary demands of everyday life." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1166 (5th una-
bridged lawyer's ed. 1982); see also Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to
Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs7 A Reassessment, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135,
1139-40 (1987); Note, Protecting the Inmate's Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs,
Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 749 P.2d 358 (1988), cert. granted,109 S. CL 1337
(1989), 64 WASH. L. REV. 459, 462 (1989).
45. Such symptoms include hallucinations, delusions, and paranoid ideation. See
GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 393, 398
(6th ed. 1980) [hereinafter GOODMAN & GILMAN]; Kemna, supra note 42, at 110.
46. P. BREGGIN, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS: HAZARDS TO THE BRAIN 31 (1983); Note,
supra note 44, at 462.
47. Kemna, supra note 42, at 110. Consequently, patients may remain at home and
function in the community. Id.
48. Id Staff need no longer use brutality and seclusion to maintain order. Id
49. See supra notes 42, 44.
50. See Kemna, supra note 42, at 111. Doctors do not limit the use of antipsychotic
drugs to treating psychosis, but have prescribed them to treat nonpsychotic mental ill-
nesses such as depression and anxiety. Id. at 110 n. 14; see also GOODMAN & GILMAN,
supra note 44, at 393; Note, supra note 44, at 460.
51. Kemna, supra note 42, at 111-13.
52. See, e.g., D. JEsTE & R. WYATT, UNDERSTANDING AND TREATING TARDIVE
DYSKINESIA 1 (1982); Kemna, supra note 42, at 110.
53. Note, A Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized
Mentally 11, 82 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1720 (1982). Evidence exists indicating that doctors
over-prescribe antipsychotic drugs. See Kemna, supra note 42, at 115. Estimations re-
veal misdiagnosis of approximately 40% of institutionalized mentally ill patients. Id
Thus, many individuals ingesting these drugs are unnecessarily subjected to serious side
effects. Id.
54. Kemna supra note 42, at 110-11.
55. See Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 185 (1980); Kemna, supra note 42, at 111-14;
Note, supra note 44, at 459.
19911 Supreme Court Defines Due Process
extrapyramidal5 6 symptoms that impair "the motor system which
controls muscular movements. '157 Additional grave physical risks
occur from the use of antipsychotic drugs. These include liver
damage, changes in heart rate that can result in cardiac arrest, con-
vulsions, acute dystonia (fixed involuntary rigidity), and neurolep-
tic malignant syndrome, 5s which can lead to death from cardiac
dysfunction.59 Often these side effects disappear with discontinu-
ance of the drug;6° however, the drugs can remain in a person's
system for months, and some side effects are permanent. 61 These
antipsychotic drugs and their disabling side effects were at issue in
Washington v. Harper.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts
In 1976, Walter Harper received a prison sentence for robbery.62
While in prison, he consented to the administration of antip-
56. The extrapyramidal motor system consists of "all of the brain structures affecting
bodily... movement, excluding the motor neurons, the motor cortex, and the pyramidal
... tract." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1401 (5th unabridged lawyer's ed. 1982).
57. Kemna, supra note 42, at 112. Such side effects are common. Id. The most
common extrapyramidal symptom is akathisia, which is characterized by constant rest-
lessness and agitation. R. SHADER & A. Di MAsCIO, EXTRAPYRAMIDAL EFFECTS IN
PSYCHOTROpIC DRUG SIDE EFFECTS 92-94 (1970). Other extrapyramidal side effects are
called Parkinsonian reactions, which include akinesia and tremor. The symptoms of aki-
nesia include muscle stiffness and rigidity, mask-like face, and stooped posture. Tremor
is the rhythmic oscillation of the hands and fingers. Id. at 93. The most dramatic ex-
trapyramidal symptom is the dystonic reaction. Id. The two types of dystonic reactions
are dystonia and dyskinesia. Id at 93-94. Dystonia is characterized by prolonged abnor-
mal muscle spasms in the face, eyes, throat, lips, and tongue. Id at 93-94; see also
Kemna, supra note 42, at 112. Dyskinesia results in the most serious side effects because
it is an irreversible neurological disorder. Kemna, supra note 42, at 113. Tardive dys-
kinesia results in repetitive, involuntary, grotesque movements concentrated in the face
and mouth. Note, supra note 44, at 462. These purposeless movements include licking,
lip smacking, sucking, and chewing. Tardive dyskinesia can also cause muscle contrac-
tions in the arms, hands, and trunk. Id.
58. "[A] group of neurologic complications which may result from the administra-
tion of neuroleptic drugs... marked especially by... extrapyramidal symptoms includ-
ing rigidity and often involuntary movements, particularly facial dyskinesia. Recovery
depends on discontinuance of the drugs. Continued use can result in permanent impair-
ment of brain function or death." 3 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND
BIOLOGY 2809 (1986).
59. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychological Association in the Support of
the Respondent at 7, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599); P.
BREGGIN, supra note 46, at 71.
60. Brooks, supra note 55, at 186-87.
61. Id at 187.
62. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1990).
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sychotic drugs.63 In November of 1982, Harper refused further
medication, and his physicians had to obtain approval pursuant to
Special Offender Center (SOC) policy 600.30 to medicate him
against his will."
Regulation 600.30 allows a psychiatrist to medicate an inmate
forcibly only if the inmate suffers from a mental disorder, is
gravely disabled, or is likely seriously to harm himself, others, or
their property.65 This regulation also provides that, before ob-
taining approval to medicate forcibly, a hearing in front of a com-
mittee must be held.66
The regulation gives the inmate the right to attend this hearing,
to present evidence and witnesses, and to cross-examine staff wit-
nesses.67 The inmate also has the right to assistance of an in-
dependent lay advisor who understands the psychiatric issues
involved.6s The inmate may appeal the committee's finding to the
center superintendent, 69 and the inmate may pursue judicial review
in state court by means of an extraordinary writ or a personal re-
straint petition.70
The committee held the required hearing,71 and approved the
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs, finding that Harper's
63. Harper was given Trialafon, Hadol, Prolixin, Taractan, Loxitane, Mellaril, and
Navane. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 876 n.3, 759 P.2d 358, 361 n.3 (1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990).
64. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1033.
65. Id.
66. Id. The committee was composed of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the center's
associate superintendent. None of the committee members were involved in the diagnosis
or treatment of the inmate. Before forcing the administration of antipsychotic drugs on
an inmate, a majority of the committee, including the psychiatrist, must have voted that
the inmate was gravely disabled and suffered from a mental disorder. Id
67. Id. The regulation also required that prior to the hearing, an inmate must be
given 24-hours notice that a hearing regarding medication will be held. Prison officials
may not medicate the inmate during this 24-hour period. Further, during the hearing,
the minutes must be recorded and the inmate must receive a copy. Id. at 1034.
68. Id. at 1033-34. Harper's advisor for the initial hearing was a nurse from the
Washington State Reformatory. Id. at 1055 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Harper's advi-
sors for the periodic reviews were SOC staff members. Id (Stevens, J. dissenting).
69. Id. at 1033-34. The appeal must be made within 24 hours and the superintendent
must rule on the appeal within 24 hours. Id
70. Id. According to SOC policy, the decision of involuntary medication is subject to
periodic review. After the first refusal of medication, a committee is required to review
the case after the first seven days of treatment. After the review, treatment can continue
if re-approved. The treating psychiatrist is required to review the case and prepare a
report every 14 days. The report is sent to the Department of Corrections medical direc-
tor. Id.
71. Id.
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mental disease or disorder made him dangerous to others.72 On
appeal, the superintendent upheld the committee's finding.73 On
November 23, 1982 Harper was medicated against his will.74 This
forced drugging persisted periodically until 1986."
In 1985, Harper filed suit in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.76 He alleged that the forced medication violated his due
process, equal protection, and free speech rights under both the
United States and Washington Constitutions." The trial court
held that Harper had a fundamental liberty interest in refusing the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication.78 Additionally,
the court determined that under the standards established in Vitek,
the SOC regulation provided adequate procedural protections
against indiscriminate forced administration of antipsychotic
medication.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed. 0 That court held
that the highly intrusive nature of antipsychotic drugs made
72. Id. Harper was originally diagnosed as suffering from a manic-depressive disor-
der. Id at 1033. He currently is diagnosed as schizophrenic. Id at 1033 n.2.
73. Id at 1034.
74. Id
75. Id. Harper received periodic reviews by committees until November 1983, when
he was transferred from the SOC to the Washington State Reformatory. After one
month, officials transferred Harper back to SOC because his condition had deteriorated
without the medication. Another hearing convened and the medication committee deter-
mined that Harper suffered from a mental disorder and was considered a danger to
others. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychi-
atric Association as Amici Curiae at 5, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)
(No. 88-599). The committee and Harper's treating psychiatrist recommended that he be
treated with antipsychotic drugs. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034. Once again, Harper re-
ceived antipsychotic drugs against his will. During this period, Harper complained of
symptoms of involuntary spasms (acute dystonia) and restlessness (akathesia), but he
never exhibited any symptoms of tardive dyskinesia. Brief for the American Psychiatric
Association and the Washington State Psychiatric Association as Amici Curiae at 5,
Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599). Harper received such medi-
cation with periodic review until June 1986, when he was transferred to the Washington
State Penitentiary. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
76. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1034.
77. Id Harper also alleged a violation of state tort law. The Washington State
Supreme Court decided the case on due process grounds; therefore, the United States
Supreme Court did not address Harper's free speech and equal protection claims. Id at
1035 n.5.
78. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 876, 756 P.2d 358, 361 (1988), rev'd, 110 S.
Ct. 1028 (1990; see also Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washing-
ton State Psychiatric Association as Amici Curiae at 6, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct.
1028 (1990) (No. 88-599).
79. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 879-80, 759 P.2d at 362-63. The trial court cited Vitek v
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1976), but did not explain why the case controlled. For a full
discussion of Vitek, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
80. Harper, 110 Wash. 2d at 886, 759 P.2d at 366.
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greater procedural safeguards necessary."' According to the
Washington Supreme Court, the state must demonstrate the neces-
sity of forced administration of drugs, its effectiveness, and its role
in furthering a compelling state interest. 82 Additionally, the court
found that these elements had to be proved at a judicial hearing by
clear and cogent evidence."3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether the Washington regulation denied Walter Harper
due process."
B. Opinion of the Supreme Court
The Court,85 in a six-to-three decision, held that SOC policy
600.30 was reasonably related to a legitimate penological end. 6
The Court further held that the procedures in the policy com-
ported with due process, and, therefore, SOC officials could admin-
ister drugs to Harper against his will without a judicial hearing.87
1. Substantive Issue
After determining that Harper's claim was not moot,88 the Court
considered whether Harper had a liberty interest.8 9 Relying on
Hewitt v. Helms,9° the Court determined that the prison regulation
created a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of an-
81. Id. at 880-81, 759 P.2d at 363. The Washington State Supreme Court distin-
guished Vitek and explained that Harper needed additional procedures to protect his
liberty interest. Harper faced the forced administration of mind altering drugs, which
deserved greater protection than the prisoner in Vitek who faced the stigmatization from
a transfer to a mental hospital. Id
82. Id at 883-84, 759 P.2d at 364-65.
83. Id. "It is precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses' that
justify the requirement of adversary hearings." Id at 881, 759 P.2d 363 (quoting Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1976)).
84. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1035.
85. Id. at 1032. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Id
86. Id at 1035-40. Justice Blackmun concurred, but added that it would be a much
easier decision if the inmate were formally committed. Id at 1044 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
87. Id. at 1040.
88. Id. at 1035. The Court held that even though the state had discontinued noncon-
sensual administration of antipsychotic drugs, a case or controversy still existed. Harper
remained in the Washington prison system serving out his sentence, and he could be
transferred to SOC at any time. If he were transferred, SOC officials most probably
would attempt to administer antipsychotic drugs to Harper pursuant to policy 600.30.
But for the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, Harper would incur the same
alleged injury. Id.
89. Id. at 1035-40.
90. 459 U.S. 460 (1983), discussed supra note 4.
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tipsychotic medication as a matter of state law.91 The policy's
mandatory language entitled Harper to the expectation that medi-
cation would be administered only if he suffered from mental ill-
ness or a grave disability, or posed a danger.92
The Court also found that the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause afforded Harper protection against forcible administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs.9 3  The Court concluded that the
minimum standards94 of the due process clause did not confer
greater substantive due process rights on Harper than those
granted by the state regulation.95
Relying on Turner v. Safley96 and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,97
the Court determined the proper standard of review for the prison
regulation. The Court stated that the policy did not violate the due
process clause because it was "reasonably related to [a] legitimate
penological interest." 98  Applying this standard, the Court con-
cluded that the state had a legitimate interest in security and that
the policy was reasonably related to that interest because of its ex-
clusive application to mentally ill inmates.9 The Court deter-
mined that the proposed alternatives were unacceptable substitutes
for antipsychotic medication or were unresponsive to the State's
legitimate interests.lc0
91. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 481, 492 (1980) (historically, the due process
clause has protected an individual's right to be free from unjustified intrusions on per-
sonal security).
94. The state regulation required the committee to find that an inmate had an existing
mental disorder that would likely result in harm if treatment were not given. Harper, 110
S. Ct. at 1037. Further, the policy required that the antipsychotic medication be pre-
scribed by a psychiatrist and approved by a reviewing psychiatrist. The Court reasoned
that this regulation complied with due process because this standard considered the in-
mate's medical interests and the state's interests. Id
95. Id. at 1036-37.
96. 482 U.S. 78 (1987), discussed supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
97. 482 U.S. 342 (1987), discussed supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
98. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1037. The Court differed from the Washington Supreme
Court, which had required the state to prove by clear and cogent evidence that it had a
compelling interest in administering the drug and that such forcible administration was
both necessary and effective to further that interest. Id. at 1035-36. The Supreme Court
stated that the Washington Supreme Court erred by not applying the reasonableness stan-
dard. Id at 1037.
99. Id. at 1038.
100. Id at 1039. The Court stated that physical restraints are not a reasonable alter-
native to antipsychotic drugs because they are only effective in the short term and can
result in serious physical side effects. Furthermore, the staff may be at risk of injury. The
Court was not satisfied that Harper proved that physical restraints or seclusion were
adequate alternatives to the drugs. Id.
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2. Procedural Issue
The Court next considered the Washington Supreme Court's
holding that Harper was entitled to a full judicial hearing prior to
receiving involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs.10' To
guide its decision, the Court turned to the balancing test it devel-
oped in Mathews v. Eldridge.10 2 That test required the Court to
balance Harper's liberty interest, in light of the procedural safe-
guards of that interest, against the state's penological interest in
administering antipsychotic medication.1 0 3
The Court recognized the dangers of antipsychotic drugs and
Harper's substantial interest in avoiding unwarranted administra-
tion of these drugs."t° This interest, however, carried less weight in
the Court's balancing scheme because the Court determined that
the administrative hearing provided by the SOC policy0" ade-
quately protected Harper's liberty interest. 06 The Court then
viewed Harper's interest, in light of the protections set up to pre-
vent abuse of that interest, against the state's penological interest in
prison safety and security.107 Accordingly, the Court held that,
given the adequate procedural safeguards and the strong state in-
terests, the state could force Harper to take antipsychotic
medication.
The Court rejected the argument that leaving the decision to
medicate to a medical professional rather than a judge violated
Harper's procedural due process rights. 108 The Court reasoned
that this system conserved scarce prison resources and that a medi-
cal professional's determination of this matter adequately, if not
better, served Harper's interests. °9 Further the Court found no
101. Id. at 1040.
102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976), discussed supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
103. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1041. The Court determined that, although Harper's inter-
est in avoiding antipsychotic drugs was great, the procedures provided adequately pro-
tected his rights. Id. at 1041-42.
104. Id. at 1041-42.
105. The policy provided that a psychiatrist rather than a judge should make the
ultimate decision to medicate. Id. at 1042.
106. Id. at 1040-42.
107. Id. at 1037.
108. Id. at 1042.
109. Id. For support, the Court relied on Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The
Court cited Parham for the proposition that the due process clause is not violated if a
medical professional makes the decision to force medication. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042.
In Parham, the Court held that when deciding whether to institutionalize a child, due
process is satisfied if a neutral fact finder makes some kind of inquiry to determine
whether the admission requirements are met. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606. The Court fur-
ther explained that due process does not require the fact finder to be trained in the law,
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institutional biases11° and found that medical professionals could
make independent decisions."' The Court further held that the
regulation's provision for a lay advisor adequately protected the
inmate; therefore, representation by counsel was not required. 1 2
C. The Dissent
The dissenting justices' 13 found three errors in the majority opin-
ion.114  First, the dissent argued that the majority undervalued
Harper's liberty interests."I5  The administration of antipsychotic
drugs against Harper's will, the dissent argued, created "a substan-
tial risk of permanent injury and premature death."'"1 6 The dissent
noted Harper's strong opposition to the drugs and the high risk of
harmful and permanent side effects. 1 7 Adopting the reasoning of
the Washington State Supreme Court, the dissent equated the in-
trusiveness of the administration of drugs to electroconvulsive
therapy,"" which alters the chemical balance in the inmate's
brain."1
9
Second, the dissent argued that the majority of the Court mis-
read the SOC policy and misapplied the Turner decision. 120 Ac-
nor does it require a formal or quasi-formal hearing. Id. at 607. In fact, the Court found
that a psychiatrist was the most qualified fact finder in that situation. I
The Harper Court also relied on Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In
Youngberg, the Supreme Court determined that an involuntarily committed mental pa-
tient has constitutionally protected liberty interests in reasonably safe conditions, reason-
able training, and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints. Id at 314-25. The Court
explained that when determining reasonableness, it would show deference to qualified
professionals' judgments. Id at 322.
110. The Court stated that the trial court made specific findings that Harper had a
history of assaultive behavior and that the procedures required by policy 600.30 were
followed. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1043.
111. Id
112. Id. at 1044.
113. Id. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, in which
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
114. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. "Inmate Harper stated [that] he would rather die th[a]n take medication." Id.
at 1046 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Electroconvulsive therapy is "[a] form of shock therapy that is most effective in
the treatment of depression, in which unconsciousness and/or convulsions are induced by
the passage of an electric current through the brain." THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNO-
TATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 724 (1987).
119. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873,
878, 759 P.2d 358, 362 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The dissent explained that
drugs profoundly effect an individual's thought process and often result in permanent
severe side effects. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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cording to the dissent, three possible state interests existed: (1)
punishment for Harper's crime; (2) cure for Harper's mental ill-
ness; and (3) a mechanism to maintain order. 21  The majority as-
serted that the drugs would only be administered against an
inmate's will for treatment and in the interest of the inmate.1 22
Although the dissent recognized the state's legitimate interest in
prison security, it disagreed with the majority's determination that
the State's interests in security and an inmate's medical interests
established independent justifications for medicating inmates forci-
bly.1 23 The dissent stated that the Court misapplied the Turner
standard.1 24 It argued that policy was an "exaggerated response"
to the state security interests. 125 It compared this regulation to the
similar Missouri prison regulation in Turner v. Safley, 126 which
prohibited inmate marriages except in an emergency and for com-
pelling reasons.
In turn, the dissent offered alternatives to the Court's finding
that there were no cost-effective alternatives to forced medica-
tion.1 27 The dissent declared that a more narrowly tailored policy
would provide feasible alternatives at marginally increased costs.1 28
Such a policy could permit withdrawal of the drugs from those
who would actually refuse the antipsychotic medication and who
121. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id at 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority and dissent agreed that the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication could not be used for punishment.
The dissent cited Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in which it determined that an
inmate retains a protectable liberty interest in not being transferred to a mental hospital
without additional procedures. Such a transfer would be a consequence that qualitatively
differed from the punishment an inmate normally suffered. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1047
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 1049-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1049 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 1050 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The policy essentially allows the long-term
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs if the prison official found that the inmate
posed a risk to himself, others, or even property. Id at 1049 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, according to the dissent, Policy 600.30 allows the sacrifice of an inmate's substan-
tive right to avoid forced administration of antipsychotic drugs for the purpose of ad-
vancing institutional and administrative interests, without any consideration of the
inmate's medical interests. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent characterized policy
600.30 as an exaggerated response because it was based on purely institutional concerns.
Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also directed attention to another provision of
policy 600.30, not in issue, which allowed for forced medication for 72 hours for an
emergency that occurred when" 'an inmate [was] suffering from a mental disorder and as
a result of that disorder present[ed] an imminent likelihood of serious harm to himself or
others.' " Id. at 1050 (emphasis in original) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting policy
600.30).
126. 482 U.S. 78 (1987), discussed supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
127. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1050-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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did not pose an imminent danger to others. 129
According to the dissent, the majority's most critical error in
reading the SOC policy was holding that the administrative hear-
ing provided therein afforded Harper adequate due process protec-
tion. 30  The dissent found the regulation inadequate because it
failed to provide for an unbiased decision maker who would con-
sider only Harper's best interests when determining Harper's
proper drug treatments.13 ' The regulation's decision makers, ac-
cording to the dissent, possessed two conflicts of interest.1 32 First,
the hearing committee members reviewed their colleagues' work,
who in turn reviewed their work. 33 Second, the committee mem-
bers were not concerned only with the inmate's needs, but also
with controlling the mentally disturbed inmate in the most conve-
nient way.' 34
The dissent's third criticism of the policy was the absence of an
effective mechanism for overruling an erroneous or arbitrary com-
mittee decision to medicate.' 35 The dissent stated that an adminis-
trative hearing conducted by impartial professionals could meet
the due process requirements, but because the policy failed to pro-
vide such protection, the Washington Supreme Court's decision
should have been affirmed.' 36
129. Id. at 1050 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the evidence did not
show that more than a marginal number of inmates would refuse the drugs under a vol-
untary program. Id. n. 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, less dangerous tranquil-
izers could be substituted for the antipsychotic drugs. Id at 1051 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
130. Id at 1052 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that this type of in-house
system allows the members to be susceptible to pressures that can result in bias. Id. n.22.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, although the committee members who partici-
pated in the first hearing could not be involved in the inmate's current treatment, they
could be involved in all subsequent decisions to continue medication. Id at 1052-53.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. The committee members were employed by the prison; thus, their jobs de-
manded that they be concerned with controlling the inmate. Id at 1053 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the decision
makers and the entire procedure are concerned with institutional control rather than the
medical interests of the inmate; therefore, the procedures do not protect the liberty inter-
ests of the inmate. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Turner and O'Lone Do Not Apply
Upon conviction, inmates retain certain rights; 137 other rights
are limited and gven extinguished. 138 If prison officials seek to re-
strict those remaining rights, the officials must do so within the
confines of due process. 139 In Washington v. Harper, all nine Jus-
tices agreed that under the due process clause and SOC policy
600.30, Harper possessed a liberty interest in remaining free from
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs1 40 The Justices di-
verged, however, in their determination of how much procedural
process was due to Harper before his interest could be subjugated
to state interests.
The majority relied on Turner v. Safley 1 41 and O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz 42 to support its decision allowing Harper's involuntary
medication. In Turner and O'Lone respectively, the state deprived
inmates of their right to communicate and their right to religious
expression. In both of those cases, the Court recognized those
rights as fundamental, but held that they succumbed to the state's
interest in prison security.
The majority's reliance on those cases was misplaced because the
right to be free from forced administration of antipsychotic drugs
is unique.1 43 Bodily intrusion by the antipsychotic drugs pro-
foundly affects the thought process and will likely cause severe and
137. Rights that remain include: the right to be free from unjustified intrusions on
personal security, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); protection from depriva-
tion of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972); the right of access to the courts, Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); and
protection from invidious discrimination based on race, Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333
(1968).
138. The right to marry is substantially restricted. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
95 (1987). The right to be free from confinement is extinguished. See Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
139. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 491-94 (1983); Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979).
140. See Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1036.
141. 482 U.S. 78 (1987), discussed supra notes 9-19 and accompanying text.
142. 482 U.S. 342 (1987), discussed supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
143. Harper v. State, 110 Wash. 2d 873, 833 n.9, 759 P.2d 358, 364 n.9 (1988), rev'd,
110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The intrusiveness of antipsychotic drugs parallels electroconvul-
sive therapy. See supra note 42. In the past, courts allowed unwilling patients a judicial
hearing prior to forced electroconvulsive therapy. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at 16 n.40, Washington v. Harper,
110 S. Ct. 1028 (199) (No. 88-599) (citing Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp., 196 Cal. App. 3d
1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241, modified, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987);
People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967 (Colo. 1985); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730,
731-32 (Ky. 1981)).
Supreme Court Defines Due Process
permanent disabling side effects.I" Harper experienced both phys-
ically and mentally adverse side effects, including insomnia,
blurred vision, dry mouth, muscle spasms, hallucinations, and a
tendency toward committing suicide.145 The seriousness of the in-
trusion upon Harper's mind and the potentially gruesome side ef-
fects vividly attest to Harper's heightened need for procedural
protection before the prison compelled him to take mind and body
altering drugs.
Another distinguishing factor that amplifies the Court's mis-
placed reliance on Turner and O'Lone is that in both cases, the
Court justified the infringement on communication and religious
rights by explaining that the inmates did not suffer a total depriva-
tion of those rights.'" In contrast, unlike the inmates in Turner
and O'Lone, Harper suffered a total deprivation of his right to re-
main free from bodily intrusions the moment the first drug entered
his bloodstream. Thus, Harper differs from Turner and O'Lone in
this crucial respect, and the Court erroneously ignored this differ-
ence in relying on those cases to Harper's detriment.
The drugs will continue to alter Harper's thought process for the
duration of his treatment, and even if the medication is discontin-
ued, the resulting disabling side effects may be permanent. Consid-
ering the complete destruction of Harper's fundamental right to be
free from unjustified bodily intrusions, Harper deserves greater
procedural due process protections than those afforded in Turner
and O'Lone.
B. Transfer and Change in Confinement Terms Require
Additional Protections
Both the majority and the dissent failed to discuss the implica-
tions of Harper's transfer from the penitentiary to the SOC. The
Court in Vitek held that a transfer from a prison to a mental hospi-
tal without a prior hearing deprived the inmate of a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause. 47 The inmate's transfer con-
stituted a "grievous loss" by exceeding the range of expected pun-
144. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
145. Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief and Monetary Damages at 6,
Harper v. State, No. 85-2-00394-1 (Wash. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 1, 1985).
146. Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 92 (1987). The regulation did not deprive the
inmates of all means of expression. Id.; see also O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352 ( regulation
prohibiting inmates from attending certain congregational services did not constitute a
free-exercise deprivation).
147. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980), discussed supra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
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ishments the inmate was sentenced to endure."14 In Washington v.
Harper, Harper was imprisoned for robbery, not for a mental ill-
ness or for failure to take antipsychotic medication. 14 9 Therefore,
his expected punishment did not include a transfer to SOC nor the
forced administration of antipsychotic medication. According to
Vitek, the Court should have provided Harper with additional due
process, including a hearing,150 before the transfer and involuntary
medication occurred.
Harper's transfer to a mental hospital triggered the need for ad-
ditional due process protections, as did the substantial change in
his confinement terms. The Supreme Court, in Wolff v. McDon-
nell,1 51 held that a major change in confinement terms required
procedural due process. Forced drugging clearly constitutes a ma-
jor change in confinement that more significantly affects an inmate
than a transfer from a prison to a mental hospital.1 52 A change in
facilities may improve the care of the inmate and is always revers-
ible. On the other hand, forced medication of antipsychotic drugs
can result in adverse side effects and potentially irreversible disabil-
ities. 1 53 It is precisely the threat of these dangers that dictates
greater procedural protections than policy 600.30 provides.
C. Policy 600.30 Is Procedurally Defective
At a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity
to be heard within a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner. 154 Policy 600.30, on its face, appears to supply inmates with
adequate procedural due process. In reality, however, these pur-
ported protections are meaningless. The policy provides inmates
with twenty-four hours advance notice of the hearing in which the
committee will decide whether to medicate the inmate forcibly.
During the twenty-four hour period prior to the hearing, no medi-
148. Id at 492. The inmate's conviction extinguished his right to freedom from con-
finement, but did not include the right to classify him as mentally ill and allow forcible
psychotropic treatment without further procedural due process protections. Id at 493-
94.
149. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1032 (1990).
150. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495-96 (hearing required for inmate prior to transfer to
mental institution).
151. 418 U.S. 539 (1974), discussed supra notes 38-30 and accompanying text.
152. Such a transfer triggers due process. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
153. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Psychological Association in Support of
Respondent at 17, Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (No. 88-599).
154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), discussed supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
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cation may be administered.155 This brief period fails to satisfy the
notice requirement because psychotropic drugs can affect patients
for months.15 6
Additionally, policy 600.30 falls short in its attempt to provide
inmates with an adequate opportunity to be heard. Although the
policy affords inmates the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
and present evidence, these rights are meaningless for two reasons.
First, if the drugs continually influence the inmate, the inmate's
abilities to exercise these rights will be inhibited. Second, the pol-
icy fails to provide the inmate with representation by counsel. A
drugged inmate or one suffering from mental illness is not capable
of presenting evidence or conducting a cross-examination. As the
Court stated in dicta in Vitek, the need for legal assistance is
greater when an inmate is thought to be suffering from a mental
disease that requires involuntary treatment.' 7 In that situation,
the inmate will be less likely to understand or be able to exercise
his rights. 158
Furthermore, a potential bias taints the hearings provided by
policy 600.30.159 Initially, a committee that has not diagnosed or
treated the inmate makes the decision to medicate. 60 On the other
hand, periodic reviews held to decide whether an inmate requires
continued medication do not require disinterested committee mem-
bers. '6 Thus, these reviews risk continuing medication based on
the inherent bias of the committee. 62
Considering the shortcomings of policy 600.30, the United
States Supreme Court should compel the Washington prison sys-
tem to confer additional procedural protections on inmates faced
155. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1055 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. Id. n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980).
158. Id.
159. Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1052-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even though doctors
may be the best individuals to diagnose illness and prescribe treatments, they are not
necessarily the best individuals to determine whether the inmate is entitled to refuse such
treatment. Doctors are concerned with treating a medical condition and not with the
liberty interests violated by such treatment. Id. at 1053 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further-
more, policy 600.30 clearly permits forced medication based on security and other non-
treatment concerns. Id. at 1048-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1052 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1052-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1052 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent presented data from New
Jersey mental institutions. In 1980, external reviews by independent psychiatrists re-
sulted in discontinuation or reduction of 59% of dosages. When the review policy was
changed from an external to an internal peer review system, the percentage dropped to
2.5%. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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with the prospect of forced medication. When prison officials and
treating psychiatrists recommend forced medication, the Court
should require a judicial hearing prior to actual medication. "It is
precisely '[t]he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses'
that justify the requirement of adversary hearings. "163
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper unfairly narrowed
an inmate's due proces rights. Although the Court found that
prison inmates possess a substantive due process right to refuse an-
tipsychotic medication, the Court substantially undervalued that
liberty interest. Additionally, the Court failed to provide adequate
procedural due process protections. When one reflects upon the
potentially permanent and disabling side effects of the drugs, the
need for a formal judicial hearing is unquestionable. Without the
benefit of adequate counsel, the procedural protections provided by
the regulation, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses and
present evidence, are meaningless. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's inability to recognize the potentially inherent bias in the
regulation's decision-making body deprives the inmate of a truly
impartial procedure.
CATHLEEN R. MARTWICK
163. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980), discussed supra notes 26-31 and ac-
companying text.
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